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Hips and hearts: the variation in incentive effects of
insurance across hospital procedures
Denise Doiron, Denzil G. Fiebig and Agne Suziedelyte∗†
School of Economics, University of New South Wales
Abstract
The separate identification of effects due to incentives, selection and preference
heterogeneity in insurance markets is the topic of much debate. In this paper, we
investigate the presence and variation in moral hazard across health care proce-
dures. The key motivating hypothesis is the expectation of larger causal effects
in the case of more discretionary procedures. The empirical approach relies on
an extremely rich and extensive dataset constructed by linking survey data to ad-
ministrative data for hospital medical records. Using this approach we are able
to provide credible evidence of large moral hazard effects but for elective surgeries
only.
Keywords: health insurance; asymmetric information; moral hazard.
JEL: D82; I11; I13.
1 Introduction
A relationship between health insurance coverage and health care utilisation is easy to
establish but more difficult to explain. Observing the typical positive correlation could be
the result of adverse selection, where people with high expected usage of health services
purchase (more) insurance or it could be moral hazard, where those who are insured
face lower costs of health care leading to increased utilisation of health services (Arrow,
1963). Findings of negative correlations in certain markets has sparked research focussing
on a third source of correlation, namely, that of preference heterogeneity; variation in
∗Corresponding author: Monash University, Centre for Health Economics, Building 75, Clayton VIC
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risk aversion, cognitive skills, or bequest motives has been shown to lead to correlation
between insurance purchase and outcomes. Institutional factors also play a role. For
example, the information available to insurers and the degree with which they can design
contracts based on this information vary substantially across markets and areas. In
brief, the sign and magnitude of the correlation between insurance and utilisation is an
empirical matter and disentangling each of these factors is difficult. It is perhaps not
surprising to find quite different net effects both in sign and magnitude across markets
and institutional environments. In this paper we focus on a different source of variation,
that coming from differential incentives faced by consumers.
Our empirical approach starts with the hypothesis that if moral hazard is present in the
case of health insurance, it will appear differentially across diverse health services. Thus,
analyses at an aggregate level such as total hospital admissions, which is typical in the
existing literature, will likely be subject to aggregation biases and hence mask the true
situation. Using an extremely rich and extensive dataset we are able to provide credible
evidence of variation in moral hazard effects. The data are constructed by linking a
survey of older individuals to administrative data for hospital inpatient medical records.
The survey is part of the Sax Institute’s 45 and Up Study of over 265,000 residents of the
state of New South Wales (NSW) in Australia. These data are sufficiently detailed to
allow identification of relatively heterogeneous procedures and with the very large number
of observations available there are a sufficient number of procedures to allow credible
analyses of the insurance-utilisation relationships at a highly disaggregated level. The
use of specific procedures allows us to address the issue of heterogeneity in the incentive
effects of health insurance on hospitalisation. In particular, surgeries that are elective
or non-urgent such as hip replacements are distinguished from non-elective or urgent
procedures such as coronary artery bypass graft surgeries (CABG). As elective procedures
are more discretionary in nature, the patient will be much more involved in whether to
have the procedure or not as well as when to have it.
Selection and preference heterogeneity remain a threat for the identification and esti-
mation of the causal impact of private health insurance on the demand for surgical
procedures. One approach would be to exploit the panel nature of the administrative
data, which in the case of hospital admissions, is available from 2000 to 2009. However,
the survey, which is linked to the administrative data, was collected only once during
this period and this is the source of the insurance status of individuals. Even with the
availability of insurance information matching the time period corresponding to the ad-
ministrative data, the lack of variation in the insurance status of older individuals would
likely leave the effect unidentified in any analysis controlling for individual fixed effects.
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The predominant approach in separating incentive effects from selection in the literature
on private health insurance has been the use of instrumental variables. Finding good in-
struments has been challenging and in many cases, the identifying instrumental variables
have not been convincing nor supported by strong empirical evidence. So while many of
the instruments that have previously been used are available in our dataset, we do not
actively pursue this approach.
Instead, our primary approach is to exploit the rich set of controls we have at our disposal,
including extensive self-reported health measures obtained from the survey as well as past
health care utilisations obtained from the administrative data. Thus, selection effects are
dealt with by the use of proxies that form a comprehensive picture of an individual’s
health status and history thereby minimising the likelihood of any omitted health effects
being a threat to inference. Some support for our approach is provided by Buchmueller
et al. (2005) in their survey of the insurance-utilisation relationship in health. They do
not find large differences in inferences across different econometric methods and they
conclude that: “(...) there is a high degree of concordance among the results of studies
that use extensive health status controls and demographic variables to control for the
nonrandom assignment of insurance status and those using instrumental variables or
quasi-experimental regression techniques.” As for the potential confounding effect from
preference heterogeneity, we follow most of the literature by using controls representing
variation in risk behaviours.
The empirical results provide strong evidence of moral hazard in the case of elective
surgeries, but not in the case of non-elective surgeries. Insurance increases the probability
of having an elective surgery by 0.659 percentage points, which corresponds to a 21.7 per
cent increase from the mean. The estimated insurance effect on non-elective surgeries
is substantially smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant. These results are
robust to additional specification checks.
2 Background
2.1 Literature review
The case for incentive effects in association with health insurance is arguable since health
care may be perceived to be unpleasant and only to be sought in situations of necessity.
Nevertheless, it is now generally accepted that health insurance has some causal impact
on health care utilisation. As stated by Pauly (2006):
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“there is one thing we do know: people do not just use medical care based on how sick
they are and what doctors order is not just based on their medical training; in both cases,
insurance matters.”
Studies analysing the effects of insurance on utilisation span many different countries
and different institutional environments. Empirical studies generally find positive cor-
relations. However, there have been few large-scale health insurance experiments (the
RAND experiment of the mid 1970’s and the recent Oregon experiment), and the sep-
aration of causal effects has relied in many cases on exclusion restrictions that may be
problematic (for example, socio-economic variables affecting utilisation only through in-
surance in studies with coarse information on health). The use of program changes in
health insurance as natural experiments have also been widely applied in various con-
texts. Examples of studies estimating causal effects are: Ettner (1997), Vera-Hernandez
(1999), Harmon and Nolan (2001) and Jones et al. (2006). Examples based on natural
experiments are: Currie and Gruber (1996), Stabile (2001), Remler and Atherly (2003),
Decker and Remler (2004), Currie and Fahr (2005), McWilliams et al. (2007), Grignon
et al. (2008), Ketcham and Simon (2008), Card et al. (2009), Hullegie and Klein (2010)
and Anderson et al. (2012). Studies using panel data that control for unobserved fixed
effects are less common but include the recent work of Bolhaar et al. (2012) for Ireland
where they find no evidence of moral hazard.
In their survey, Buchmueller et al. (2005) concentrate on US studies and do not find
large differences in inferences about the insurance-utilisation relationship across differ-
ent econometric methods. This suggests that variation in institutional contexts may be
driving differences in empirical estimates. One other potential reason for the variation
in estimated causal effects is the likely heterogeneity in impacts across types of medical
problems and the amount of discretion the patient has. Due to data limitations, existing
studies of the causal effects of insurance on health care have used aggregate measures
of utilisation and so cannot distinguish between the different incentives across types of
care. (One exception is the distinction between GP and specialist care; e.g. Jones et al.
(2006).) Furthermore, aggregation weights and characteristics of the relevant population
are likely to vary across institutional environments in ways that may reinforce the aggre-
gation bias. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the variation in incentive
effects of health insurance across the different types of hospital care.
Much of the recent empirical literature on insurance markets generally has focused on the
presence of asymmetric information and selection effects. See Finkelstein and McGarry
(2006), Cohen and Einav (2007), Fang et al. (2008) and Olivella and Vera-Hernndez
(2013) for examples and Cohen and Siegelman (2010) for a survey. Interest in this liter-
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ature was sparked by findings of advantageous selection in particular insurance markets.
Heterogeneity in preferences is believed to lead to advantageous selection in certain mar-
kets; depending on the context, this heterogeneity in preferences can take the form of
variation in risk aversion, cognitive skills or utility of wealth. Certain recent papers have
focussed on the separation of the distributions of risk types from preference types and the
estimation of correlation in these marginal distributions. This requires more stringent
structural assumptions, but the argument is that identification of these distributions is
needed for welfare analysis. See Einav et al. (2010) and Einav and Finkelstein (2011) for
a discussion of this area. In most of these studies, moral hazard is ignored in order to
focus on the identification of the two other sources of correlation between insurance and
outcomes. (An exception to this is the paper on health insurance by Cardon and Hendel
(2001).)
Previous Australian studies looking at the effects of insurance on utilisation have generally
found positive effects although the magnitudes vary a lot across studies. This is perhaps
not surprising given the variety of identification strategies used. Savage and Wright (2003)
and Lu and Savage (2006) consider selection on observables only. Several studies have
used instrumental variables to separate causal effects from selection. Examples include
Cameron et al. (1988), Srivastava and Zhao (2008), Cheng and Vahid (2011) and Doiron
(2012). Most of these studies rely to some extent on exclusion restrictions involving socio-
economic or demographic variables and in some cases risk behaviours (smoking, drinking,
exercise and BMI). Doiron (2012) is an exception to this; she looks at the effects of private
health insurance on hospital utilisation for couples only. The identification strategy relies
on the exclusion of partner’s health and expectations regarding future children in one’s
hospital use (conditional on one’s health and actual children).
2.2 The Australian institutional environment
Australia has a health care system that is a mix of public and private funding and
delivery. Medicare is a universal public insurance system which provides all Australian
citizens with free public hospital treatment, including services provided by emergency
departments, and subsidised out-of-hospital medical services and pharmaceuticals. In
addition to this public insurance, there exists a private health insurance sector. Patients
covered by private insurance have access to private hospitals and private treatment in
public hospitals. Individuals without private cover can also access private hospitals as
self-funded patients. An important fact for our analysis is that elective and non-elective
procedures are performed in both private and public hospitals.
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Private health insurance can be used to cover the costs of hospital stays but not doctors’
visits; this is true for general practitioners and for specialists. Private health insurance
can also be used to cover other procedures and items such as prostheses and ancillary
services which include dental care, allied health services and complementary care. Most
individuals who purchase private health insurance buy hospital cover and may or may
not purchase cover for ancillary services. Less than 5% of the insured have cover for
ancillaries only. In this paper we consider hospital insurance only and if individuals do
not have hospital cover they are considered as uninsured.
The cost sharing arrangements in the Australian hospital system are based on the in-
surance status of the patient as well as the type of hospital in which they are admitted.
For public hospitals, Medicare covers 100% of hospital costs for public patients. For pri-
vate patients (who could be self-insured or privately insured) in either public or private
hospitals, Medicare covers 75% of the Medicare Scheduled fee. Private providers are not
restricted to charging the Medicare Scheduled fee and so patients face a liability for any
residual payment required (25% of the Scheduled fee plus charges above this). For private
patients with private health insurance this may involve out-of-pocket expenses depending
on the fees set by the private provider and the cost-sharing arrangements (co-payments
and deductibles) of their particular policy. However, there has been an upward trend in
no-gap policies that avoid such expenses and according to PHIAC (2008) the proportion
of benefits paid for in-hospital medical services with no gap in New South Wales was 81.2
per cent in 2008. Note that individuals with private health insurance are not excluded
from the public system; an individual always has a choice to use or not to use private
health insurance.
Depending on the particular insurance policy held by a private patient, the out-of-pocket
costs for a specific procedure may be higher than if they were undergoing the hospital
stay as a public patient. This is true regardless of the hospital in which the procedure is
performed. The question is then why do patients buy and use health insurance for their
hospital procedures? One answer is that private insurance allows you to jump queues
and hence provides shorter waiting times. (We return to the issue of waiting times in
the discussion of the results.) There are other benefits of private insurance the main one
being a greater choice of doctor and hospital. Having access to an experienced surgeon
working in a well-equipped and well-staffed private hospital is a major benefit of private
health insurance. Incentive effects of insurance identified in this paper can be due to
differences in the quality of care as well as differences in costs between public and private
sectors. We would argue that this interpretation of moral hazard is not inconsistent with
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the literature as very few studies have any measure of, or control for, the quality of the
insured services.
Two features of the Australian setting help simplify our analysis. First, private health
insurance is not tied to employment as it is in many environments. This makes the
modelling of the demand for insurance easier since accounting for selection into em-
ployment and employer-provided insurance cover is not needed. Second, the system is
community-rated; insurers cannot refuse to insure or adjust premiums based on individ-
ual characteristics including any past usage of medical services. There are two excep-
tions to this: premiums increase by a fixed amount of two per cent per year of age for
30 ≤ age ≤ 65 for those who purchased private health insurance after 2000, and insur-
ers can impose waiting times of up to a year for insurance claims involving pre-existing
conditions. Community rating implies that providers have limited opportunities to ex-
clude or separate different risk types. Since insurers cannot base provision or features
of the insurance contract on personal characteristics, the relationship between observed
characteristics of the consumer and the decision to purchase insurance reflects consumer
preferences and information rather than insurers’ reaction to potential adverse selection.
It is worth noting that in such a system, we expect adverse selection to be greater both
because of community rating and due to the presence of a universal public insurance
system (Vera-Hernandez, 1999).
Coverage of private health insurance in Australia has been high despite being limited
largely to private in-hospital treatment and the availability of high-quality free public
hospitals. A common argument presented by Australian policy makers is that a well-
functioning private system is needed for the sustainability of a high-quality public sys-
tem. Policy initiatives implemented around the year 2000 have created incentives for
individuals, especially those with higher incomes to purchase private health insurance.
But for the period under study the institutional environment remained stable and no
major reforms were implemented. For additional details on the Australian private health
insurance system, please see Colombo and Tapay (2003).
3 Empirical strategy
The aim of this paper is to identify the incentive effects of private health insurance on the
demand for elective and non-elective surgeries. To disentangle these effects from selection
and preference heterogeneity, we need to control for the confounding variables that may
affect both the demand for private health insurance and the demand for surgeries. The
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baseline specification of the model is given by:
s∗ijt = αjPHIi,t−1 +X
′
i,t−1βj + uijt,
sijt = 1[s
∗
ijt > 0], (1)
where subscript t refers to the time period, j indicates the type of a surgery (elective or
non-elective) and i refers to an individual. The variable s∗ijt is the net benefit associated
with having a surgery, which is unobserved. Instead, we observe sijt, that is, whether
or not a person has a surgery in period t. This variable takes the value 1 if the net
benefit s∗ijt is positive and the value 0 otherwise. We assume that the error term uijt
follows a standard normal distribution and estimate equation (1) by probit regression.
To account for the possibility that an encounter with the health care system may affect
an individual’s demand for private health insurance and in turn lead to simultaneity bias,
we estimate a prospective model. More specifically, the coefficient αj measures the effect
of having private health insurance in period t on the probability of having a particular
type of surgery in the next period.
The vector Xi,t−1 contains two main types of variables, measured at the same time as
an individual’s private health insurance status: (1) health measures to capture expected
future health usage and tastes for health and (2) risk preferences proxied by risk be-
haviours. The argument underlying adverse selection in insurance markets is that the
demand for insurance is positively correlated with the expected health costs or usage in
the next period; this is related to the health state in the next period which in turn is
positively related to an individual’s health in the current period. Therefore, if one fails to
properly control for an individual’s health status, the positive coefficient on the insurance
status variable cannot be convincingly interpreted as a moral hazard effect of insurance.
In this analysis, we have access to a very rich dataset constructed by linking survey data
to administrative data for hospital medical records. These data are used to construct
an extensive list of health measures; as detailed below, we use over 230 objective and
subjective health variables to control for the person’s health status.
An individual’s demand for private health insurance may also be positively correlated
with his/her level of risk aversion. Ceteris paribus, more risk averse individuals will be
willing to pay more for insurance; they may also invest more in their health and, in
turn, have lower need for surgery. Thus, omitting controls for an individual’s risk pref-
erences from equation (1) may lead to under-estimation of the insurance effect especially
in cases where health status is poorly measured. In our case, better measurement of
health through the use of extensive health controls will minimize these potential biases.
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Nevertheless, it is possible that individual preferences affect utilization and insurance
demand directly rather than through actual health status; for example, the so-called
“worried-well” person may also be more likely to purchase cover. Another example is a
case where more risk averse (and/or health conscious) individuals choose to have surgical
procedures as preventive measures. We partly account for this by including past health
care utilization measures, as such persons are likely to have had higher health service
usage in the past. Following the literature, we also use measures of risk behaviours, in-
cluding smoking, drinking, exercise, diet and use of preventive health care, to proxy for
an individual’s preference type.
The main premise of this paper is that we expect to find stronger evidence of moral hazard
in the demand for elective surgeries than in the demand for non-elective procedures. For
this reason, we estimate equation (1) separately for selected elective and non-elective
surgeries. Making statements that these effects are causal normally requires the use of
alternative strategies such as instrumental variables. In our case we simply do not believe
that any of the instruments we have available are credible. Instead we argue that the use
of an extremely rich set of controls gives us confidence that what we find is in fact causal.
However, we cannot definitely rule out the possibility that residual omitted factors remain
that may bias our results. To gauge how likely this is in our case, we rely on the extent to
which the inclusion of variables, specifically designed to control for biases due to selection
and risk attitudes, impact the magnitude of the estimated insurance coefficient. Such an
approach is in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005) who compare the impact of possible
omitted variables with the impact of observed control variables. In doing so, we also
exploit collateral information provided by conducting the analysis separately for elective
and non-elective surgeries. While a priori there might be cases for biases going in either
direction, we argue that if biases due to omitted variables (such as risk preferences) do
exist they should be in the same direction for both elective and non-elective surgeries.
4 Data
We use a rich dataset constructed by merging survey data with administrative medical
records. Access to these data enables us to control for many variables that are usually
unobserved. The survey data come from the 45 and Up Study, a survey of over 265,000
individuals 45 years of age or over, who were randomly selected from the residents of
New South Wales (NSW), the largest state of Australia. The sampling frame includes all
individuals in the target age range who were covered by Medicare, Australia’s universal
public health insurance program. Medicare covers all Australian citizens and permanent
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residents. Mail questionnaires were used to collect information from the participants.
Recruitment in the study started in early 2006 and the final questionnaires were received
in the beginning of 2010, but most of the questionnaires were completed in 2008. Around
18 per cent of those sent questionnaires participated and the full sample includes around
10 per cent of the eligible population (45 and Up Study Collaborators, 2008). Johar
et al. (2012) demonstrated that the 45 and Up sample is broadly representative of the
populations of NSW and Australian in terms of most demographic and socio-economic
characteristics (age, gender, marital status, and employment). On the other hand, there
is some selection on household income and country of birth. To take this selection into
account, we have controlled for country of birth, income and other variables that may be
related to income (education and housing type) in our analysis.
The 45 and Up Study provides information about the respondents’ socio-economic and
demographic characteristics, medical conditions, physical limitations, mental health, sur-
gical procedures, medications, lifestyle, diet, social connections and other health related
factors. The survey data, with the consent of all the participants, are linked to the re-
spondents’ medical records. More specifically, we have information on the respondents’
hospitalisations, emergency department visits and the use of medical services and pre-
scription medicines. For this analysis, we mainly use the hospitalisation data that come
from the NSW Admitted Patient Data Collection and cover all hospital admissions of
the sample individuals from 2000 to 2009. Admissions to public and private hospitals
and day procedure centres are included in the data. Detailed information is provided on
each admission, including the exact time and date of admission and separation, diagnosed
conditions and performed procedures.
The initial sample contained 266,804 individuals. The criteria for the inclusion of obser-
vations in the analysis sample are as follows. First, we exclude 1,330 individuals who were
not chosen but volunteered to participate in the 45 and Up Study, as they may introduce
selection bias. Second, a small number of invalid records (individuals younger than 45
years of age) are excluded from the sample (22 observations). Third, only individuals
interviewed in 2006-2008 are used for the analysis, because we are estimating a prospec-
tive model and hospitalisation data, which is used to construct dependent variables, ends
in 2009. Therefore, 3,604 individuals who completed the survey in 2009 and 2010 are
excluded. Additionally, 5,490 observations with missing private health insurance status
are deleted. We deal with missing data on other control variables in two ways. For the
variables with more than 1 per cent of values missing, we create indicator variables for
missing values. Observations with missing data on control variables with less than 1 per
cent of values missing are dropped from the sample. The final analysis sample contains
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249,273 observations (93.43 per cent of the initial sample). A comparison of our analysis
sample with the full 45 and Up sample shows no substantial differences in the means of
main demographic and socio-economic characteristics (details are available on request).
4.1 Variables
4.1.1 Main variables
They key variable of interest is an individual’s private health insurance status, which is
reported in the 45 and Up Survey. We construct a variable that takes the value one if
an individual has private health insurance (with or without ancillary service coverage)
and the value zero otherwise. Around 65 per cent of the sample reported having private
health insurance cover.
The dependent variables used in the estimations are constructed using the hospital ad-
mission data. For each admission, the principal procedure performed on the patient is
recorded. To define whether a procedure is elective or non-elective, we use the urgency
category distribution by procedure provided by Australian Institute of Health and Wel-
fare (2012b). This information is available for 15 indicator procedures, or most common
surgeries performed in the Australian hospitals. Importantly, the classification of the
procedures is exogenous to the data analysis. In Australia, surgical procedures are di-
vided into emergencies that need to be performed within 24 hours and electives (planned
or booked) that can be postponed for at least 24 hours or more. Patients that need an
elective procedure are placed on a waiting list and assigned one of the urgency categories
by their doctor (Baggoley et al., 2011):
1. Urgent - for a condition that has the potential to deteriorate quickly to the point
that it may become an emergency (admission within 30 days is desirable);
2. Semi-urgent - for a condition which is not likely to deteriorate quickly or become
an emergency (admission within 90 days is desirable); or
3. Non-urgent - for a condition which is unlikely to deteriorate quickly and which has
little potential to become an emergency (admission within 365 days is acceptable).
We begin with the case of elective surgeries. Our definition of elective surgeries in-
cludes procedures that are usually classified as non-urgent. Panel A of Table 1 lists these
procedures and presents their incidence rates by private health insurance status. The
proportion of non-urgent cases varies from 71 per cent for hip replacement to 88 per
cent for septoplasty (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012b). For the main
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analysis, we construct a binary variable that takes the value one if an individual had
any of the listed elective procedures in the 12 months following the survey date and the
value zero otherwise. We also look separately at the effects of insurance on the demand
for the three most prevalent elective procedures (cataract extraction, knee replacement
and hip replacement). The incidence rates of most of the elective surgeries are higher in
the insured sub-sample. On the other hand, the incidence rate of cataract extraction is
higher among the uninsured. As a result, the overall incidence rate of elective surgeries is
similar (around 3 per cent) in both sub-samples. Note that the zero correlation between
insurance and elective surgeries may be explained by advantageous selection and does
not imply that there is no incentive effect of insurance.
Next, we turn to the definition of non-elective surgeries. Non-elective surgeries include
procedures that are usually classified as emergency, urgent, or semi-urgent. The list
and incidence of these procedures are provided in panel B of Table 1. Appendectomy
and coronary angioplasty are emergency procedures (Australian Institute of Health and
Welfare, 2012a). The proportion of urgent or semi-urgent cases varies from 68 per cent
for myringotomy to 95 per cent for coronary artery bypass graft (Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare, 2012b). For the analysis we use a binary variable that takes the value
one if an individual had one of these procedures in the 12 months following the survey
date and the value zero otherwise. The difference in the overall incidence rate of non-
elective surgeries between the uninsured (0.661 per cent) and insured (0.597 per cent) is
not statistically significant. Note that the incidence of elective and especially non-elective
surgeries is relatively small; large samples are needed for this type of analysis.
4.1.2 Control variables
As mentioned in Section 3, the baseline model controls for two main types of variables that
are expected to affect an individual’s demand for elective and/or non-elective surgeries
and may also be correlated with his/her health insurance status. First, we control for a
number of health measures obtained from the administrative and survey data. Hospital
medical records are used to construct an individual’s history of medical conditions in the
past five years. The hospital data include principal and secondary diagnoses associated
with each admission; these are coded using the World Health Organization’s ICD-10
classification system. We have used Sightlines DxCG Risk Solutions software to aggregate
these codes to a smaller number of condition categories. In total, 24 condition categories
are included in the models (rare conditions are grouped into one category). Importantly,
we include conditions that may be directly related to the demand for the elective and
non-elective surgeries analysed in this paper. Past musculoskeletal, ophthalmic, vascular
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and ear, nose and throat diseases may increase the demand for related elective surgeries.
A history of cardiovascular or hepatobiliary (related to liver or gallbladder) diseases may
be linked to a higher likelihood of a non-elective surgery.
We also add binary variables that indicate whether or not an individual has been pre-
viously admitted to a hospital for an elective and non-elective surgery. A patient who
had a surgery in the recent past may be less likely to need the same surgery within the
next 12 months. Moreover, the removal of gall bladder and appendectomy can only be
performed once. On the other hand, a patient who had a surgery recently may need a
repeat surgery. For example, a patient who had a knee replacement operation on one
knee may need an operation on the other knee in near future. Therefore, the direction of
the relationship between past and future operations is unclear. The models also control
for past hospitalisations for other reasons.
To control for less acute health conditions that may not require a hospital admission,
hospitalisations outside our administrative data window and any other factors, we include
self-reported health measures obtained from the survey data. The 45 and Up study
contains a number of objective health measures, including diagnosed medical conditions,
recent treatments for a number of conditions, medicines taken in the past 4 weeks, history
of surgeries, family health history, long term illness/disability status, activity limitations1,
body mass index (BMI), teeth, bone and urinary health, hearing loss, incidence of falls
and mental health. Additionally the respondents are asked to self-assess their general
health, quality of life, vision, teeth health and memory. We refer to the latter variables
as subjective health measures. In total, there are 198 health measures (233 variables)
included in the model.
Second, we include an extensive list of proxies for unobserved individual preferences
to the model (29 characteristics, 41 variables). Specifically, the regressions control for
an individual’s smoking status, alcohol consumption, exercise, time spent outdoors and
on sedentary activities and use of preventative health care services (cancer screening
tests). The survey data also include a number of questions on an individual’s diet. The
respondents report how many times per week they eat various types of food (meat, fish,
cheese, bread, vegetables and fruit) and what type of milk they consume.
All regressions also control for year effects and demographic and socio-economic charac-
teristics, such as age2, sex, marital status, number of children, remoteness of the area
1The questions on activity limitations are used to construct The Medical Outcomes Study - Physical
Functioning scale. This scale ranges from 0 to 100. A higher score indicates a higher level of physical
activity.
2To allow for non-linear age effects, we include dummies for age-in-years. Individuals older than 84
years of age are grouped into one category due to small numbers of older individuals.
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of residence3, country of birth, ancestry, second language, education, income, and em-
ployment status. Type of housing is included as a proxy for household wealth. We also
control for the SEIFA Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and Disadvantage,
which measures the socio-economic status of the population in an individual’s local area
(Pink, 2006). Additionally, the survey data contains social capital variables. The respon-
dents are asked about their social interactions and social network size. The full list and
means of control variables are provided in Appendix A Table A.1. In total there are 245
controls (362 variables) included in the model.
To test the sensitivity of the results, we add an individual’s total health care expenditure
in the past calendar year to the model. Total health care expenditures include spending
on hospitalisations, emergency department visits, GP and specialist visits, diagnostic
tests, other medical services and prescription medicines. This information is obtained
from the administrative data4. Controlling for the past hospitalisations, the total health
care expenditure variable measures the use of other health care services and severity of
hospital-based diagnoses.
5 Results
All tables in this section report probit average partial effects. Standard errors are esti-
mated using the delta method (by Stata’s “margins” command). Table 2 presents the
main results. Column (1) reports the estimated effects of insurance on the demand for
elective and non-elective surgeries in the full model specification. Private health insur-
ance is found to increase the probability of having an elective surgery within the next
12 months by 0.659 percentage points, which is close to a 22 per cent increase from the
mean. This effect is highly statistically significant. The effect of private health insur-
ance compares to (or is larger than) the effects of other important determinants of the
demand for elective surgeries, such as, recent history of musculoskeletal disorders, use
of glucosamine (a supplement for osteoarthritis), having a long-term illness or disability,
poor self-assessed health, or employment status. The effect of insurance is almost as large
as a four year increase in age (at the average age of 63 years). This finding is interpreted
as evidence of a substantial incentive effect of insurance in the case of elective surgeries.
As expected, we find that private health insurance has a substantially smaller effect on
the probability of undergoing a non-elective surgery. It is estimated that health insurance
3Remoteness is measured by the Accessibility/Remoteness Index of Australia Plus (ARIA+) (Trewin,
2001). We create a dummy variable for individuals living in the major cities.
4We thank Meliyanni Johar for constructing and providing this variable.
14
cover increases this probability by 0.030 percentage points, which represents an increase
of roughly 5 per cent from the mean. Relative to the mean, the average partial effect
of insurance on non-elective surgeries is more than four times smaller than the average
partial effect of insurance on elective surgeries. Moreover, this effect is statistically in-
significant at the conventional significance levels despite a very large sample size. Thus,
we do not find any evidence of an incentive effect of insurance in the case of non-elective
surgeries.
As they stand, the results are consistent with our initial hypothesis that the incentive
effects for elective surgeries are larger than for non-electives. Moreover, taken literally
there is a large incentive effect of insurance for electives but no effect for non-electives.
To be more confident in these conclusions we need to address the question of whether
it is possible that these results are an artifact of selection on unobservables. We follow
the arguments of Altonji et al. (2005) and use the results on selection on the extensive
range of observables to gauge the consequences of potential selection effects from the
unobservables.
In columns (2)-(6 ) of Table 2, we investigate how large the biases in the estimated effects
of insurance would be if we did not include the extensive list of controls available in our
data. Each column represents the estimated insurance effect after deleting a particular
set of control variables. (Note that each set of controls is deleted from the specification
with the full set of controls.) Turning first to elective procedures, we find that the
effect of insurance is overestimated if we do not control for objective health (objective
health includes all of our health related variables except self-assessed health measures).
This result suggests that there is adverse selection on observed objective health, which
is as expected. In contrast, omitting subjective health measures (self-assessed general
health, quality of life, vision, teeth health and memory) leads to an underestimate of
the insurance effect, suggesting that, controlling for the objective health variables, there
is advantageous selection on self-assessed health. Finally, we do not find evidence of
advantageous selection on risk behaviours once all the health measures are held constant,
as omitting these variables reduces the estimated effect of insurance only slightly (from
0.659 to 0.656).
The exclusion of socio-economic characteristics also has practically no impact on the
estimated effect of insurance on elective surgeries (the average partial effect drops from
0.659 to 0.654). On the other hand, we find that it is important to control for age as
omitting the age dummies causes an upward bias in the average partial effect of insurance
on elective surgeries. Age may be capturing unobserved aspects of health. Older people
may have a higher probability of getting a surgery even conditional on observed health.
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For example, doctors may be more likely to take health complaints of an older person
seriously as future health consequences may be more severe.
In the case of non-elective surgeries, the pattern of results is similar to that found for
elective surgeries indicating that biases move in the same direction. The main difference
for non-elective surgeries is that the estimated effect of insurance remains small and
insignificant in all of the specifications.
The results in Table 2 indicate that if there are any remaining biases, they are likely to
move in tandem for the two types of surgeries and to be larger for electives. If there were
remaining biases associated with advantageous selection, then the incentive effects would
in fact be larger for both types of surgeries and the discrepancy between them would
likely increase. Our conclusions would be strengthened. A more plausible threat to our
core conclusions is the case of remaining biases associated with adverse selection. Because
we believe the causal effect of insurance to be non-negative, the maximum bias in the
estimated effect for non-electives can only be small. This leaves us with the question of
whether a bias due to adverse selection could conceivably eliminate the entire effect that
is currently observed for elective surgeries. Comparing the baseline estimate (column 1)
to that associated with the exclusion of all objective health measures (column 2) provides
an indication of possible bias resulting from adverse selection. While this estimated bias
is economically large, if replicated by a set of unobservables it would not be sufficient to
eliminate the baseline effect. Given the extensive list of controls obtained not only from
the survey, but also from the administrative data, it is very unlikely that selection on the
unobserved health-related variables would be more severe than selection on the currently
observed variables. These arguments lead us to be confident in the baseline estimates of
the incentive effect of insurance on surgeries.
Next, we look at what particular variables are driving selection in private health insurance
cover. Table 3 presents the probit average partial effects of the main control variables
(objective and subjective health measures and risk behaviours) on the demand for elec-
tive and non-elective surgeries and insurance cover. The results show that an important
source of adverse selection is past hospitalizations, which are positively related to both
the demand for elective and non-elective surgeries and the demand for insurance. Ad-
ditionally, the variables that signal poor joint health (recent hospital-based treatment
for musculo-skeletal disorders, consumption of glucosamine and earlier hip or knee re-
placements) increase both the probability of an elective surgery and the probability of
insurance.
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We find that a main driver of the finding of advantageous selection for subjective health
is self-assessed vision. Better self-assessed vision is associated with increased probability
of insurance cover and lower demand for elective surgeries. Some self-assessed health
measures contribute to adverse selection; for example in the case of dental health and
quality of life, better self-assessed health is related to more surgery and a higher incidence
of cover. Although poor self-assessed health increases the probability of a non-elective
procedure, it reduces the probability of an elective procedure. It may seem counterintu-
itive for individuals who rate their health as good or better to be more likely to undergo
an elective surgery in the 12 months following the survey date. A possible explanation
for this result is that the self-assessed health variable measures unobserved aspects of
health which may make an individual more or less suitable for a surgery. An individ-
ual in poor health may choose to wait for an improvement before undergoing surgery if
there is indeed scope for discretion in the scheduling of the procedure. Individuals in
poor health may also have greater caregiving needs after a surgery and their choice of
whether to undergo an elective surgery or not may be constrained by the availability
of a caregiver. Alternatively, controlling for the objective health measures, self-assessed
health may proxy for optimism or other personality factors that have positive effects on
the demand for elective surgeries.
There is also evidence of advantageous selection into insurance for some of the risk be-
haviours. The demand for private health insurance is correlated with smoking, fruit
consumption, choice of the type of milk, and cancer screening in expected directions. On
the other hand, the insured have higher alcohol consumption and are not more likely
to exercise, eat vegetables or choose healthier sources of protein or carbohydrates than
the uninsured. Most of the risk behaviours do not significantly affect the demand for
surgeries, which explains why the exclusion of these behaviours from the models does
not change our main results (see Table 2). This finding is not surprising given that we
control for numerous subjective and objective health measures. There is also no strong
support in our data for the hypothesis that individuals choose elective surgery as a pre-
ventive measure. The probability of an elective surgery is positively correlated with only
a few health-enhancing behaviours (the number of hours spent outdoors on weekend, fruit
consumption and breast/prostate cancer screening).
The effects of demographic and socio-economic variables are presented in Appendix A Ta-
ble A.2. Once the health measures are fixed, most of these variables have no effect on the
probabilities of elective and non-elective surgeries. Given that Australia has a universal
health care system and all Australian residents are eligible for free public hospital treat-
ment, this result is not surprising. Some results are worth noting. Employed individuals
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are found to have lower demand for elective surgeries, perhaps because the time cost of a
surgery is higher for them. We also find that people living in aged care facilities have a
lower probability of an elective surgery. Remoteness of the area of residence is not found
to be a barrier to health care access; if anything, individuals living in regional or remote
areas are slightly more likely to have an elective surgery compared to individuals living
in the city. The demographic variables are correlated with the demand for insurance
as expected; similarly, the demand for insurance increases with higher socio-economic
status, as measured by education, income, SEIFA and employment.
As shown in Table 2 and unlike other demographic and socio-economic variables, the
controls for age have a large impact on our main results. The predicted probabilities of
elective and non-elective surgeries and private health insurance by age are presented in
Figure 1. The conditional probability of an elective surgery increases with age, whereas
the probability of a non-elective surgery does not vary significantly by age. The prob-
ability of having private health cover is increasing with age until around 65 years and
slightly decreases afterwards. (Age-in-year dummies are jointly statistically significant in
the insurance and elective surgery equations at the 0.1% level while in the non-elective
surgery equation, age dummies are only statistically significant at the 10% level.) The
most striking aspect of Figure 1 is the strength of the relationship between age and the
probability of elective surgery even with extensive health controls. Nevertheless, it is still
the case that the effect of age on electives is smaller than the effects of the most relevant
health variables. If we calculate the average effect of a one year increase in age across all
ages, this average age effect is smaller than the effects of such health measures as past
diagnosis of musculo-skeletal disorders or eye disease, recent treatment for arthritis, use
of supplements for arthritis, or poor self-assessed vision. For example, a change from
excellent to poor vision increases the probability of an elective surgery by as much as a
nine year change in age from the sample average (63 years).
To address the possibility of remaining selection effects, in Table 4 we examine whether
our main results are affected by the inclusion of an individual’s total health care expen-
ditures in the past year. Specifically, we include a binary variable indicating whether or
not an individual had any health care expenditures, dummies for expenditure quintiles
as well as a 3rd order polynomial in continuous expenditures (in thousand dollars). Note
that the sample size is smaller in these models, because this information is only available
for the respondents who completed the 45 and Up survey in 2007 and 2008. For this rea-
son, columns (1) and (3) present the estimates of the baseline model using this smaller
sample. Columns (2) and (4) report the estimated effects of insurance with the health
care expenditure variables added to the model. Having positive health care expenditures
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significantly increases the probability of an elective surgery in the next year by 0.711
percentage points. Being in a higher health care expenditure quintile also increases the
likelihood of both types of surgeries. Controlling for health care expenditures reduces
the average partial effects of private health insurance status only slightly. The estimated
effect of insurance on the probability of an elective surgery changes from 0.679 to 0.657
percentage points. Statistically insignificant effects of insurance on the probability of a
non-elective surgery remain in both specifications. We have also repeated this analysis
excluding outliers (the top 1 per cent in the distribution of expenditures) and obtained
very similar results to those presented in Table 45.
We examine next the question of heterogeneity in the effect of insurance across specific
procedures and also look at the effect of insurance on hospitalizations as a whole. Columns
(1) - (3) of Table 5 present the effects of private health insurance on the most common
elective surgeries: cataract extraction, hip replacement and knee replacement. Relative
to the mean, private health insurance cover has the largest effect on the probability
of hip replacement (29 per cent) followed by the probability of knee replacement (26
per cent). The probability of having a cataract extraction is least affected by private
health insurance status (16 per cent). The latter finding may be explained by the fact
that cataract extraction is a less complicated procedure than knee or hip replacement;
therefore, the benefits of insurance may be smaller. Additionally, the price of cataract
surgery is lower than the price of the other two surgeries.
The last column of Table 5 reports the estimated effect of insurance cover on the probabil-
ity of having a hospitalization for any reason. This estimate aggregates over the insurance
effects on the elective and non-elective surgeries, as defined above, and hospitalizations
for other purposes. This aggregate measure of health care utilization is often used in the
5As an added check on the robustness of our results, we also estimated 2SLS regressions instrumenting
insurance status with a subset of instrumental variables used by Cameron et al. (1988) and Srivastava and
Zhao (2008) (marital status, country of birth, a dummy for metro areas, education, past hospitalizations
for purposes other than elective and non-elective surgeries, a dummy for having a child under 18 years
old, as well as its interaction with marital status (to indicate single parent households), smoking status,
a dummy for being a heavy drinker, a dummy for being overweight, and a dummy for not exercising).
Using the full set of instrumental variables, we reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the error term based on overidentification tests for both elective and non-elective
surgeries. Following this, we used a reduced set of identifying instruments that we believe are less likely
to violate the exogeneity assumption (marital status, country of birth, urban, education, children under
18 years of age and an interaction of the children variable with marital status). With this reduced set
of instrumental variables, we pass the overidentification tests for both elective and non-elective surgeries
but only marginally so in the case of elective surgeries (the p-value is 2%). Qualitatively, the results
from the latter specification are comparable to the probit average partial effects presented in Table 2
in the sense that (1) we find no evidence of moral hazard in the case of non-elective surgery (the 2SLS
estimate is in fact negative but highly imprecise) and (2) we find evidence of a positive causal effect of
insurance in the case of electives but again the 2SLS estimate is very imprecise.
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literature. Relative to the mean, the estimated effect of insurance on any hospitalization
is roughly 16 per cent; this lies between the effect on non-elective surgeries and that on
elective surgeries. This finding illustrates that the use of aggregate measures of health
care utilization may mask larger effects of insurance on some services as well as zero
impact on other services.
We conclude this section with a discussion of waiting times for procedures. Jumping
the queue is one of the usual reasons given for insurance purchase in Australia. The
importance of differential waiting times for insured and uninsured patients is particularly
relevant when using data collected over a fixed window of observation. This potential
problem is that of right hand side (RHS) censoring of the data and refers to a window
of observation which is too short relative to the standard waiting time for a procedure.
The potential effect of RHS censoring in our context would be to exaggerate the size of
the incentive effect of insurance as we may be excluding uninsured patients who undergo
a surgery further in the future. Although we do not observe when patients were placed
on a waiting list, we have looked at other evidence related to waiting times and we do
not believe that censoring is driving our results.
First, we provide statistics on average waiting times for procedures in NSW public hos-
pitals. During the analysis period, 88.9 per cent of the non-urgent procedures were
performed within 365 days (Baggoley et al., 2011). For the main elective procedures
studied in the paper, the median waiting times are 131 days for hip replacement, 163
days for cataract surgery and 226 days for knee replacements (Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare, 2013). If differences in waiting times between the insured and unin-
sured were indeed driving our results, we would expect to find larger insurance effects on
the demand for cataract extraction and especially knee replacement than on the demand
for hip replacement. To the contrary, we find that the insurance cover has the largest
effect on the probability of hip replacement (relative to the mean), as shown in Table 5.
We also exploit information on specialist services which is available in our dataset to com-
pare the relationship between the use of specialist services and the incidence of surgery
for the insured and uninsured. The underlying hypothesis is that, if waiting times for
procedures are driving our main results, the probability of a procedure conditional on
having seen a specialist would be lower for an uninsured individual relative to a com-
parable person covered by private insurance. Note that hospital procedures can only be
scheduled by specialists hence patients must consult a specialist before undergoing any
of these procedures.
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We estimate these conditional probabilities using all observations with the required in-
formation. Since the data on specialist visits is not available for the 2006 respondents,
the sample is restricted to the respondents who completed the survey in 2007 or 2008.
(The resulting subsample represents 86% of the full analysis sample.) Given the small
incidence of the procedures, we also estimate the conditional probabilities for those indi-
viduals who are more likely to need the procedures. Specifically, we estimate the incidence
of elective surgery in the next 12 months on all controls including insurance status. We
then calculate the predicted probability of having a surgery setting insurance status at
1 for everyone and we select individuals who have a predicted probability that exceeds
the average predicted probability in the subsample of individuals who actually received
a surgery (equal to 8.84 per cent).
For the full 2007-8 sample and the restricted high probability of surgery sample we per-
form the following exercise. We regress the incidence of elective surgery on all the controls
(including insurance) plus a variable measuring the number of specialists visits in the
past 12 months and an interaction of specialists visits with insurance status. Given our
definition of elective surgery, we restrict attention to two types of specialist services: or-
thopaedic surgeons and eye specialists/optometrists. In Table 6, we present the effects of
the number of specialists visits in a given year on the incidence of surgery in the following
year by insurance status. To illustrate the results, we use an example. Take an uninsured
individual with characteristics that make him/her a high risk for elective surgery in the
coming year. Suppose this individual has one more visit with an orthopaedic surgeon
during the year, then he/she has a probability of undergoing elective surgery which is
2.152 percentage points higher in the following year than a comparable person who does
not have the additional visit. A comparable individual with insurance has a probability of
surgery which is 1.910 percentage points higher. Hence insurance cover does not increase
the probability that a specialist visit leads to a procedure. If censoring was indeed driv-
ing our results, we would expect the effects of insurance to increase the probability of a
procedure following a specialist visit. What we see instead is either no effect of insurance
or a negative effect in the case of eye specialists.
6 Conclusion
Using a unique data set we have examined the relationship between insurance status
and health care utilisation at a disaggregated level. By comparing results for particular
elective surgeries with those from non-elective surgeries and by exploiting a comprehensive
set of controls for an individual’s health and past health care utilisation we are able to
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provide evidence that an average incentive effect (due to the use of aggregate data) can
mask a large variability. Specifically, in the case of elective surgeries, we find incentive
effects of around 22 per cent relative to the mean, while for non-elective procedures, there
is no evidence of any moral hazard.
These results must be placed in the context of a mixed private-public system. In a
different system where non-elective services are not available without private insurance,
we would expect perhaps less variation in the incentive effects but we would still expect
more discretionary services to also involve greater moral hazard. The Australian system
is also characterised by community-rating so that insurers are not able to design contracts
that price insurance according to risk type. This feature would be expected to lead to
more extensive selection problems in private health insurance. However, our extensive
dataset and sensitivity analysis suggests that we have dealt with selection on risk types
in a satisfactory manner. Finally our data refer to an older population (45 years of age
or more) but it is this older subpopulation that consumes the majority of health services
and will be the major source of future growth in health expenditures making research of
the type presented here even more important in terms of understanding the impact of
incentives on the use of health services.
Acknowledgements
This research is funded by an ARC Discovery Project grant (DP110100729). It uses data
from the 45 and Up Study, which is managed by the Sax Institute in collaboration with
major partner Cancer Council New South Wales, and partners the Heart Foundation
(NSW Division); NSW Ministry of Health; beyondblue; Ageing, Disability and Home
Care, NSW Family and Community Services; Australian Red Cross Blood Service; and
UnitingCare Ageing. This project was undertaken by the University of Technology Syd-
ney and utilised PBS data supplied by the Department of Human Services and linked to
the 45 and Up Study by the Sax Institute. Data linkage for the hospital admission data
used in the project was undertaken by the Centre for Health Record Linkage. The project
has ethics approval from the NSW Population and Health Services Research Ethics Com-
mittee and the Department of Health and Ageing Departmental Ethics Committee. The
study’s findings are those of the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Department of Health and Ageing, or the Department of Human Services. The project
is funded by an ARC Discovery Project grant (DP110100729). We are grateful to two
anonymous referees, the Editor Luigi Siciliani, Elizabeth Savage, Glenn Jones, Meliyanni
Johar, Rosalie Viney and the participants of the 10th Summer Workshop in Health Eco-
22
nomics, 4th Australasian Workshop on Econometrics and Health Economics and 67th
European Meeting of the Econometric Society for their encouragement, useful comments
and suggestions. All opinions and any mistakes are our own.
References
45 and Up Study Collaborators (2008). Cohort profile: the 45 and up study. International
journal of epidemiology, 37(5):941–947.
Altonji, J., Elder, T., and Taber, C. (2005). Selection on observed and unobserved
variables: Assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools. Journal of Political Economy,
113(1):151–184.
Anderson, M., Dobkin, C., and Gross, T. (2012). The effect of health insurance coverage
on the use of medical services. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4(1):1–
27.
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. American
Economic Review, 53(5):941.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2012a). Australia’s hospitals 2010-11 at a
glance. Health services series no. 44.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2012b). National definitions for elective
surgery urgency categories. Submission information paper.
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2013). National elec-
tive surgery waiting times data collection. http://www.aihw.gov.au/
national-elective-surgery-waiting-times-data/, accessed on 20 january 2014.
Baggoley, C., Owler, B., Grigg, M., Wellington, H., Monaghan, M., and Hartley-Jones,
J. (2011). Expert panel review of elective surgery and emergency access targets under
the national partnership agreement on improving public hospital services. Report to
the Council of Australian Governments.
Bolhaar, J., Lindeboom, M., and van der Klaauw, B. (2012). A dynamic analysis of the
demand for health insurance and health care. European Economic Review, 56(4):669–
690.
Brien, S. E., Ronksley, P. E., Turner, B. J., Mukamal, K. J., and Ghali, W. A. (2011).
Effect of alcohol consumption on biological markers associated with risk of coronary
23
heart disease: systematic review and meta-analysis of interventional studies. BMJ,
342.
Buchmueller, T. C., Grumbach, K., Kronick, R., and Kahn, J. G. (2005). The effect of
health insurance on medical care utilization and implications for insurance expansion:
A review of the literature. Medical Care Research and Review, 62(1):3–30.
Cameron, A. C., Trivedi, P. K., Milne, F., and Piggott, J. (1988). A microeconometric
model of the demand for health care and health insurance in Australia. The Review of
Economic Studies, 55(1):85–106.
Card, D., Dobkin, C., and Maestas, N. (2009). Does Medicare save lives? The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 124(2):597–636.
Cardon, J. H. and Hendel, I. (2001). Asymmetric information in health insurance: Evi-
dence from the national medical expenditure survey. The RAND Journal of Economics,
32(3):408–427.
Cheng, T. C. and Vahid, F. (2011). Demand for hospital care and private health insurance
in a mixed public-private system: Empirical evidence using a simultaneous equation
modeling approach. Melbourne Institute Working Paper No. 22/11.
Cohen, A. and Einav, L. (2007). Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice. The
American Economic Review, 97(3):745–788.
Cohen, A. and Siegelman, P. (2010). Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets.
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 77(1):39–84.
Colombo, F. and Tapay, N. (2003). Private health insurance in Australia: a case study.
OECD health working papers No. 8.
Currie, J. and Fahr, J. (2005). Medicaid managed care: effects on children’s Medicaid
coverage and utilization. Journal of Public Economics, 89(1):85–108.
Currie, J. and Gruber, J. (1996). Health insurance eligibility, utilization of medical care,
and child health. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111(2):431–466.
Decker, S. L. and Remler, D. K. (2004). How much might universal health insurance
reduce socioeconomic disparities in health? A comparison of the US and Canada.
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 10715.
Doiron, D. (2012). Using partner’s information to identify the causal effects of insurance
on utilization. Mimeo, University of New South Wales.
24
Einav, L. and Finkelstein, A. (2011). Selection in insurance markets: Theory and empirics
in pictures. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(1):115–138.
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A., and Levin, J. (2010). Beyond testing: Empirical models of
insurance markets. Annual Review of Economics, 2(1):311–336.
Ettner, S. L. (1997). Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the
elderly. Journal of Health Economics, 16(5):543–562.
Fang, H., Keane, M. P., and Silverman, D. (2008). Sources of advantageous selection: Ev-
idence from the Medigap insurance market. Journal of Political Economy, 116(2):303–
350.
Finkelstein, A. and McGarry, K. (2006). Multiple dimensions of private information:
Evidence from the long-term care insurance market. American Economic Review,
96(4):938–958.
Grignon, M., Perronnin, M., and Lavis, J. N. (2008). Does free complementary health in-
surance help the poor to access health care? Evidence from France. Health Economics,
17(2):203–219.
Harmon, C. and Nolan, B. (2001). Health insurance and health services utilization in
Ireland. Health Economics, 10(2):135–145.
Hullegie, P. and Klein, T. J. (2010). The effect of private health insurance on medical care
utilization and self-assessed health in Germany. Health Economics, 19(9):1048–1062.
Johar, M., Jones, G., and Savage, E. (2012). Healthcare expenditure profile of older
australians: Evidence from linked survey and health administrative data. Economic
Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy, 31(4):451–463.
Jones, A. M., Koolman, X., and Doorslaer, E. v. (2006). The impact of having supple-
mentary private health insurance on the use of specialists. Annals of Economics and
Statistics / Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, (83/84):251–275.
Ketcham, J. D. and Simon, K. (2008). Medicare part D’s effects on elderly drug costs
and utilization. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14326.
Lu, M. and Savage, E. (2006). Do financial incentives for supplementary private health
insurance reduce pressure on the public system? Evidence from Australia. CHERE
working paper 2006/11.
25
McWilliams, J. M., Meara, E., Zaslavsky, A. M., and Ayanian, J. Z. (2007). Health of
previously uninsured adults after acquiring Medicare coverage. JAMA: The Journal of
the American Medical Association, 298(24):2886–2894.
Olivella, P. and Vera-Hernndez, M. (2013). Testing for asymmetric information in private
health insurance. The Economic Journal, 123(567):96–130.
Pauly, M. V. (2006). Adverse selection and moral hazard: Implications for health insur-
ance markets. Oberlin College Health Economics Conference paper, September 8-10.
PHIAC (2008). Operations of Private Health Insurers Annual Report 2007-08. Private
Health Insurance Administration Council, Canberra.
Pink, B. (2006). Socio-economic indexes for areas (SEIFA). Technical paper. Australian
Bureu of Statistics.
Remler, D. K. and Atherly, A. J. (2003). Health status and heterogeneity of cost-
sharing responsiveness: how do sick people respond to cost-sharing? Health Economics,
12(4):269–280.
Savage, E. and Wright, D. J. (2003). Moral hazard and adverse selection in Australian
private hospitals: 1989-1990. Journal of Health Economics, 22(3):331–359.
Srivastava, P. and Zhao, X. (2008). Impact of private health insurance on the choice of
public versus private hospital services. HEDG Working Paper 08/17.
Stabile, M. (2001). Private insurance subsidies and public health care markets: Evidence
from Canada. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d’Economique,
34(4):921–942.
Trewin, D. (2001). ABS views on remoteness. Information paper. Australian Bureu of
Statistics.
Vera-Hernandez, A. M. (1999). Duplicate coverage and demand for health care. The case
of Catalonia. Health Economics, 8(7):579–598.
26
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080
45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
P r
e d
i c
t e
d  
p r
o
b a
b i
l i t
y ,
 
P H
I
P r
e d
i c
t e
d  
p r
o
b a
b i
l i y
,  
s u
r g
e r
i e
s
Age
Elective surgery Non-elective surgery PHI
Figure 1: Predicted probabilities of elective and non-elective surgeries and private health
insurance.
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Table 1: Incidence rates of elective and non-elective surgeries by PHI status
No PHI PHI z-stat
A. Elective surgeries
Any elective surgery 3.109 3.000 1.510
Cataract extraction 2.186 1.812 6.280
Knee replacement 0.480 0.569 -2.951
Hip replacement 0.361 0.415 -2.118
Varicose vein stripping and ligation 0.068 0.121 -4.270
Septoplasty (repair of septum) 0.039 0.096 -5.613
Tonsillectomy 0.008 0.012 -1.072
Myringoplasty (repair of eardrum) 0.007 0.009 -0.501
B. Non-elective surgeries
Any non-elective surgery 0.661 0.597 1.901
Cholecystectomy (removal of gall bladder ) 0.414 0.310 4.049
Coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) 0.137 0.126 0.698
Coronary angioplasty 0.064 0.076 -1.116
Appendectomy 0.035 0.047 -1.399
Myringotomy (opening of eardrum) 0.014 0.038 -3.933
Observations 87,652 161,621
Notes: Incidence rates are presented in percentages. The last column presents z-statistics for
the equality of means test.
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Table 2: Estimated effect of PHI in the full model and alternative specifications
Excluded variables
Full model Obj. health Subj. health Risk beh. SES Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Elective surgeries
Average partial effect, ppt 0.659∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.073) (0.076)
Change from mean, % 21.695 27.716 19.891 21.593 21.537 27.136
Bias, % of mean 6.020 −1.804 −0.102 −0.158 5.441
Pseudo R-squared 0.145 0.106 0.133 0.144 0.143 0.126
B. Non-elective surgeries
Average partial effect, ppt 0.030 0.042 0.030 0.031 0.032 0.038
(0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Change from mean, % 4.892 6.861 4.843 4.924 5.118 6.200
Bias, % of mean 1.970 −0.048 0.032 0.226 1.308
Pseudo R-squared 0.058 0.025 0.056 0.057 0.055 0.054
Control variables:
Objective health Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subjective health Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Risk behaviours Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socioeconomic status Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Demographic variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Sample size is 249,273. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions include time
effects. Symbol ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 0.1% level.
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Table 3: Effects of health measures and risk behaviours on elective and non-elective
surgeries and PHI
Elective surgeries Non-elective surgeries PHI
APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E.
Surg el 1yago 1.897∗∗∗ (0.276) 0.172 (0.141) 0.350 (0.713)
Surg el 2yago 0.077 (0.221) −0.044 (0.115) 1.460∗ (0.727)
Surg el 3yago −0.156 (0.228) 0.269 (0.177) 0.783 (0.762)
Surg el 4yago −0.139 (0.236) 0.151 (0.150) 1.282 (0.785)
Surg el 5yago −0.307 (0.241) 0.344 (0.200) 0.961 (0.816)
Surg nel 1yago 0.204 (0.392) −0.158 (0.113) 2.641∗ (1.047)
Surg nel 2yago −0.300 (0.338) 0.589∗ (0.253) 2.076∗ (1.045)
Surg nel 3yago −0.196 (0.357) 0.507∗ (0.252) 4.707∗∗∗ (1.030)
Surg nel 4yago 0.282 (0.394) 0.079 (0.189) 4.808∗∗∗ (1.029)
Surg nel 5yago −0.179 (0.362) 0.075 (0.203) 2.741∗ (1.093)
Hosp oth 1yago 0.519∗∗∗ (0.126) 0.203∗∗ (0.064) 3.268∗∗∗ (0.339)
Hosp oth 2yago 0.539∗∗∗ (0.131) −0.019 (0.060) 3.669∗∗∗ (0.347)
Hosp oth 3yago 0.255 (0.134) 0.163∗ (0.071) 4.021∗∗∗ (0.358)
Hosp oth 4yago 0.333∗ (0.138) 0.162∗ (0.072) 5.191∗∗∗ (0.360)
Hosp oth 5yago 0.358∗ (0.142) 0.159∗ (0.075) 3.259∗∗∗ (0.376)
Hdiag infec 1 0.122 (0.260) −0.119 (0.106) −1.413 (0.777)
Hdiag maneo 1 0.169 (0.258) −0.072 (0.108) 1.966∗∗ (0.711)
Hdiag beneo 1 0.190 (0.164) 0.094 (0.080) 2.041∗∗∗ (0.464)
Hdiag diabet 1 −0.150 (0.212) 0.111 (0.116) 0.709 (0.668)
Hdiag metabol 1 −0.131 (0.188) 0.220∗ (0.108) −3.141∗∗∗ (0.604)
Hdiag hepabil 1 0.339 (0.456) 1.465∗∗∗ (0.422) −1.576 (1.244)
Hdiag gastro 1 0.052 (0.129) 0.131 (0.067) 1.139∗∗ (0.379)
Hdiag musskel 1 0.769∗∗∗ (0.172) −0.064 (0.071) 2.871∗∗∗ (0.456)
Hdiag hematol 1 −0.384 (0.238) 0.055 (0.130) −1.274 (0.823)
Hdiag psychi 1 −0.005 (0.417) −0.186 (0.145) −0.683 (1.168)
Hdiag neuro 1 0.144 (0.254) 0.056 (0.129) 2.357∗∗ (0.743)
Hdiag cardio 1 −0.124 (0.151) 0.060 (0.080) −0.912 (0.488)
Hdiag vascu 1 −0.420 (0.221) −0.044 (0.114) 1.271 (0.769)
Hdiag pulmo 1 −0.121 (0.224) −0.089 (0.100) −1.561∗ (0.719)
Hdiag ophthal 1 2.891∗∗∗ (0.320) −0.057 (0.107) 0.511 (0.711)
Hdiag ENT 1 −0.334 (0.276) 0.238 (0.162) 3.826∗∗∗ (0.839)
Hdiag urinar 1 −0.206 (0.189) −0.153 (0.079) −0.333 (0.609)
Hdiag genital 1 0.173 (0.254) 0.102 (0.122) 0.503 (0.674)
Hdiag derma 1 −0.164 (0.241) −0.067 (0.115) 0.031 (0.770)
Hdiag injury 1 −0.345 (0.254) −0.001 (0.139) −0.786 (0.829)
Hdiag screen 1 −0.032 (0.120) −0.143∗∗ (0.050) 0.239 (0.364)
Hdiag compli 1 0.075 (0.231) −0.049 (0.109) −1.577∗ (0.748)
Hdiag lcom 1 −0.086 (0.242) 0.062 (0.124) 0.068 (0.754)
Hdiag lwdef 1 −0.233 (0.133) 0.086 (0.069) −0.127 (0.409)
Diag cancer −0.005 (0.093) −0.029 (0.046) −0.056 (0.244)
Diag hrtdis −0.129 (0.112) 0.116 (0.062) −0.156 (0.332)
Diag highbp 0.290∗∗ (0.099) 0.036 (0.047) 0.385 (0.252)
Diag stroke −0.059 (0.160) 0.093 (0.089) −1.489∗∗ (0.488)
Diag diabet −0.030 (0.158) −0.024 (0.074) −1.969∗∗∗ (0.425)
Diag bldclot 0.239 (0.150) 0.145 (0.083) −0.786 (0.415)
Diag asthmhayf −0.162 (0.092) −0.030 (0.043) 0.773∗∗∗ (0.224)
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Elective surgeries Non-elective surgeries PHI
APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E.
Diag Parkin 0.225 (0.350) −0.282∗ (0.129) 2.335∗ (0.998)
Treat cancer −0.441∗ (0.172) −0.025 (0.091) −2.969∗∗∗ (0.549)
Treat hrtattack −0.164 (0.174) 0.539∗∗∗ (0.124) −2.764∗∗∗ (0.557)
Treat othhrtdis −0.200 (0.172) 0.084 (0.090) 0.560 (0.530)
Treat highbp −0.191 (0.103) −0.037 (0.050) −0.138 (0.283)
Treat cholest −0.081 (0.100) 0.019 (0.049) −0.008 (0.276)
Treat bldclot −0.117 (0.204) −0.176∗ (0.082) 0.334 (0.625)
Treat asthma 0.183 (0.182) −0.029 (0.082) −0.545 (0.470)
Treat arthrit 1.248∗∗∗ (0.128) −0.058 (0.056) −1.457∗∗∗ (0.327)
Treat thyroid 0.025 (0.191) 0.004 (0.096) 0.264 (0.511)
Treat osteop −0.370∗∗ (0.122) −0.073 (0.068) 0.189 (0.389)
Vitamins −0.013 (0.083) −0.076∗ (0.038) 1.684∗∗∗ (0.200)
Suppl omega3 0.150 (0.078) −0.023 (0.037) 0.343 (0.193)
Suppl glucosam 0.622∗∗∗ (0.088) −0.039 (0.041) 3.040∗∗∗ (0.213)
Drugs hrtdis −0.407∗∗ (0.147) −0.055 (0.078) 0.111 (0.502)
Drugs bldclot 0.024 (0.087) 0.073 (0.046) 0.533∗ (0.247)
Drugs diabet 0.239 (0.187) 0.119 (0.094) 0.049 (0.488)
Drugs asthma 0.258 (0.165) 0.086 (0.084) −1.775∗∗∗ (0.430)
Drugs thyroid −0.028 (0.190) 0.017 (0.099) 1.329∗∗ (0.514)
Drugs osteop 0.050 (0.106) 0.009 (0.057) 2.268∗∗∗ (0.290)
Drugs hrtburn −0.090 (0.088) 0.252∗∗∗ (0.051) −0.007 (0.251)
Drugs kidney 0.425∗∗ (0.165) −0.010 (0.077) 0.203 (0.453)
Surg knee 0.945∗∗∗ (0.158) 0.012 (0.079) 3.987∗∗∗ (0.430)
Surg hip 1.109∗∗∗ (0.175) −0.066 (0.082) 4.727∗∗∗ (0.465)
Surg gallbladder −0.131 (0.103) −0.306∗∗∗ (0.039) −0.178 (0.285)
Surg heart 0.133 (0.150) 0.028 (0.071) 0.644 (0.430)
Surg reprodorg 0.133 (0.072) 0.025 (0.034) 0.734∗∗∗ (0.175)
Surg skinca −0.194∗ (0.094) −0.019 (0.047) 0.189 (0.254)
FHH cancer −0.014 (0.071) −0.038 (0.034) −0.505∗∗ (0.172)
FHH hrtdis 0.076 (0.073) 0.038 (0.035) 0.697∗∗∗ (0.177)
FHH highbp −0.183∗ (0.076) −0.011 (0.036) 0.430∗ (0.184)
FHH stroke 0.002 (0.078) −0.108∗∗ (0.036) 0.074 (0.194)
FHH diabet 0.155 (0.088) 0.029 (0.040) −0.280 (0.204)
FHH arthrit 0.134 (0.086) −0.051 (0.040) −0.410 (0.212)
FHH osteop 0.151 (0.106) −0.052 (0.048) 0.940∗∗∗ (0.251)
FHH hipfrac −0.050 (0.112) −0.047 (0.055) 0.663∗ (0.289)
FHH Parkin 0.134 (0.161) −0.096 (0.072) −0.191 (0.397)
FHH Alzh 0.035 (0.093) −0.060 (0.044) 0.486∗ (0.232)
FHH depress −0.006 (0.115) −0.054 (0.051) −1.170∗∗∗ (0.265)
Disability −0.724∗∗∗ (0.120) −0.157∗ (0.061) −1.178∗∗ (0.428)
Phys func −0.031∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.002 (0.001) 0.046∗∗∗ (0.005)
BMI 0.021∗∗ (0.007) 0.010∗∗ (0.003) −0.035∗ (0.017)
Teethnum 1 9 0.192 (0.137) 0.114 (0.075) 2.420∗∗∗ (0.359)
Teethnum 10 19 0.309∗ (0.127) 0.020 (0.063) 5.707∗∗∗ (0.315)
Teethnum 20mo 0.013 (0.120) −0.042 (0.061) 8.256∗∗∗ (0.340)
Broken bone −0.188 (0.100) −0.057 (0.049) −1.264∗∗∗ (0.268)
Urinel 1tl 0.139 (0.097) 0.008 (0.046) 0.575∗ (0.235)
Urinel 2 3t −0.015 (0.124) 0.024 (0.062) 0.388 (0.322)
Urinel 4 6t 0.162 (0.179) −0.004 (0.088) 0.178 (0.465)
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Elective surgeries Non-elective surgeries PHI
APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E.
Urinel eveday −0.175 (0.131) 0.009 (0.069) −0.186 (0.370)
Hear loss −0.096 (0.072) 0.092∗∗ (0.034) −0.042 (0.177)
SAH g 0.421∗∗∗ (0.122) −0.083 (0.053) 0.587 (0.310)
SAH vg 0.598∗∗∗ (0.155) −0.196∗∗ (0.063) −0.445 (0.370)
SAH exc 0.439∗ (0.217) −0.325∗∗∗ (0.060) −1.395∗∗ (0.467)
QoL g 0.227 (0.132) 0.068 (0.065) 1.301∗∗∗ (0.340)
QoL vg 0.375∗ (0.155) 0.091 (0.076) 2.801∗∗∗ (0.387)
QoL exc 0.140 (0.187) 0.158 (0.099) 2.719∗∗∗ (0.446)
Vision g −1.776∗∗∗ (0.089) −0.031 (0.046) 1.929∗∗∗ (0.245)
Vision vg −2.601∗∗∗ (0.089) −0.041 (0.053) 3.062∗∗∗ (0.284)
Vision exc −2.334∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.014 (0.075) 3.259∗∗∗ (0.376)
Teethh g 0.340∗∗∗ (0.092) 0.015 (0.043) 4.926∗∗∗ (0.215)
Teethh vg 0.620∗∗∗ (0.125) −0.012 (0.053) 6.972∗∗∗ (0.265)
Teethh exc 0.908∗∗∗ (0.203) 0.120 (0.087) 7.726∗∗∗ (0.367)
Memory g 0.342∗∗∗ (0.099) 0.017 (0.048) −0.034 (0.248)
Memory vg 0.652∗∗∗ (0.123) 0.114 (0.058) −0.982∗∗∗ (0.285)
Memory exc 0.681∗∗∗ (0.170) 0.091 (0.077) −2.874∗∗∗ (0.370)
Drinks pwk 0.007 (0.006) −0.012∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.224∗∗∗ (0.014)
Smoked before 0.199∗ (0.078) 0.039 (0.037) −4.395∗∗∗ (0.188)
Smokes now −0.084 (0.167) 0.122 (0.078) −8.850∗∗∗ (0.368)
Exer walk 0.006 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) −0.089∗∗∗ (0.011)
Exer vigour −0.015 (0.011) −0.005 (0.006) −0.030 (0.021)
Exer mod 0.000a (0.004) −0.004 (0.003) −0.030∗∗ (0.009)
Out hrswd −0.010 (0.013) −0.002 (0.006) −0.130∗∗∗ (0.029)
Out hrswe 0.031∗ (0.013) 0.012∗ (0.006) −0.042 (0.029)
Hrs sleep −0.028 (0.018) 0.003 (0.009) 0.023 (0.049)
Hrs sit −0.010 (0.011) 0.000a (0.005) 0.040 (0.028)
Hrs screen −0.009 (0.015) 0.004 (0.007) −0.061 (0.036)
Hrs stand −0.005 (0.011) 0.001 (0.005) −0.082∗∗ (0.025)
Pro redmeat 0.032∗ (0.013) −0.003 (0.007) 0.467∗∗∗ (0.034)
Pro chicken −0.020 (0.022) 0.019 (0.010) 0.105 (0.054)
Pro sausages 0.013 (0.022) 0.003 (0.010) −0.106∗ (0.054)
Pro fish 0.005 (0.023) −0.012 (0.012) −0.121∗ (0.057)
Pro cheese −0.011 (0.014) −0.015∗ (0.007) 0.006 (0.035)
Carbs brbread −0.002 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002) −0.063∗∗∗ (0.009)
Carbs cereal −0.023 (0.013) 0.001 (0.006) 0.428∗∗∗ (0.030)
Veg cooked 0.013 (0.021) 0.025∗∗ (0.010) 0.090 (0.052)
Veg raw −0.023 (0.024) 0.009 (0.011) 0.094 (0.061)
Fruit raw 0.056∗ (0.024) −0.023 (0.012) 0.242∗∗∗ (0.062)
Fruit juice 0.040 (0.032) 0.029 (0.015) −0.208∗ (0.083)
Milk whole −0.044 (0.122) −0.055 (0.056) −4.065∗∗∗ (0.300)
Milk lowfat −0.010 (0.119) 0.036 (0.056) 2.874∗∗∗ (0.287)
Milk skim −0.207 (0.121) 0.031 (0.059) 0.629∗ (0.299)
Milk soy −0.205 (0.141) 0.001 (0.069) −1.384∗∗∗ (0.355)
Milk other −0.104 (0.230) −0.015 (0.110) −2.680∗∗∗ (0.585)
Test psamam 0.242∗ (0.099) 0.010 (0.045) 4.273∗∗∗ (0.234)
Test bowelca 0.034 (0.075) 0.003 (0.035) 3.114∗∗∗ (0.183)
Pseudo R-squared 0.145 0.058 0.243
Wald test Chi2 stat 3760.740 862.200 14982.560
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Elective surgeries Non-elective surgeries PHI
APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E.
Wald test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mean of dep var, % 3.038 0.056 64.837
Notes: Sample size is 249,273. All regressions additionally control for hospital-based diagnoses 5, 4, 3 and 2 years ago,
socio-economic and demographic characteristics and time effects. The bottom panel presents Chi-square statistics and
p-values for Wald test of joint significance of all health and health risk variables. Symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical
significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. Symbol a indicates that the absolute value of the coefficient is less
than 0.0005.
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Table 4: Sensitivity of results to adding total health care expenditure in the past year,
probit average partial effects (ppt)
Elective surgeries Non-elective surgeries
Baseline HC expend. added Baseline HC expend. added
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private health insurance 0.679∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.018
(0.084) (0.084) (0.040) (0.040)
Total HC expenditure > 0 0.711∗ 0.089
(0.307) (0.124)
Total HC expenditure quintile:
2nd 0.341∗ 0.153∗
(0.137) (0.061)
3rd 0.545∗∗∗ 0.094
(0.136) (0.060)
4th 0.909∗∗∗ 0.139∗
(0.144) (0.064)
5th 0.881∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.183) (0.082)
Total HC expenditure, thousand AUD −0.036∗∗ 0.008
(0.012) (0.006)
Mean of dep var, % 3.042 3.042 0.578 0.578
Pseudo R-squared 0.144 0.145 0.061 0.062
Sample size 214,601 214,601 214,601 214,601
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions control for objective and subjective
health measures, risk behaviours, socio-economic and demographic characteristics and time effects.
Symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Effects of PHI on most common procedures and any hospitalization
Cataract Knee Hip Any
extraction replacement replacement hospitalization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average partial effect, ppt 0.319∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 4.080∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.033) (0.028) (0.195)
Change from mean, % 16.402 25.632 28.712 15.988
Pseudo R-squared 0.193 0.227 0.202 0.118
Sample size 249,273 249,273 249,273 249,273
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions control for the objective and
subjective health measures, socio-economic and demographic characteristics, risk behaviours and time
effects. Symbol ∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 0.1% level.
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Table 6: Effects of the number of specialist services on probabilities of elective surgery,
probit average partial effects (ppt)
Full 2007-08 Sample High Predicted Prob of Surgery
Uninsured Insured Uninsured Insured
Orthopaedic 0.574∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 2.152∗∗∗ 1.910∗∗∗
surgeon (0.063) (0.052) (0.236) (0.177)
Eye specialist 0.192∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.721∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
or optometrist (0.017) (0.019) (0.064) (0.064)
Sample size 214,601 18,177
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. In addition to insurance cover and specialist visits,
all regressions control for the objective and subjective health measures, socio-economic and
demographic characteristics, risk behaviours and time effects. Symbol ∗∗∗ denotes statistical
significance at the 0.1% level.
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A Additional tables
Table A.1: Description and means of control variables
Variable name Description Mean Observations
A. Demographic characteristics
Agea Age in years 62.644 249,273
Male =1 if male 0.461 249,273
Married =1 if married/lives with partner 0.757 249,273
Children Number of children 2.456 249,273
Loc cityb =1 if lives city 0.450 249,273
Loc remotreg =1 if lives in a remote/regional area 0.550 249,273
CoB Au =1 if born in Australia 0.759 247,088
CoB ES =1 if born in English speaking country 0.126 247,088
CoB NESb =1 if born in non-English speaking country 0.116 247,088
Ances Au =1 if Australian ancestry 0.523 246,682
Ances En =1 if English/Irish/Scottish ancestry 0.591 246,682
Ances othEu =1 if other European ancestry 0.121 246,682
Ances oth =1 if other ancestry 0.134 246,682
Oth lang =1 if speaks other language than English at home 0.093 249,273
Educ lthsb =1 if hasn’t completed high school 0.341 245,543
Educ hs =1 if has high school diploma 0.099 245,543
Educ trade =1 if did trade/apprenticeship 0.112 245,543
Educ cert =1 if has certificate/diploma 0.212 245,543
Educ univ =1 if has university degree 0.236 245,543
Inc lt5kb =1 if HH income is less then $5000 per year 0.019 196,209
Inc 5 10k =1 if HH income is $5000-$9999 per year 0.050 196,209
Inc 10 20k =1 if HH income is $10000-$19999 per year 0.176 196,209
Inc 20 30k =1 if HH income is $20000-$29999 per year 0.123 196,209
Inc 30 40k =1 if HH income is $30000-$39999 per year 0.101 196,209
Inc 40 50k =1 if HH income is $40000-$49999 per year 0.093 196,209
Inc 50 70k =1 if annual HH income is $50000-$69999 0.134 196,209
Inc mt70k =1 if annual HH income >= $70000 0.304 196,209
SEIFA 1decb =1 if in 1st decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.024 249,273
SEIFA 2dec =1 if in 2nd decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.074 249,273
SEIFA 3dec =1 if in 3th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.067 249,273
SEIFA 4dec =1 if in 4th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.109 249,273
SEIFA 5dec =1 if in 5th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.091 249,273
SEIFA 6dec =1 if in 6th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.151 249,273
SEIFA 7dec =1 if in 7th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.120 249,273
SEIFA 8dec =1 if in 8th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.091 249,273
SEIFA 9dec =1 if in 9th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.081 249,273
SEIFA 10dec =1 if in 10th decile of SEIFA Index of rel soc-econ adv/disadv 0.193 249,273
Employed =1 if full-time, part-time or self- employed 0.476 246,864
Housing agedcb =1 if lives in an aged care facility 0.044 249,273
Housing flat =1 if lives in a flat 0.107 249,273
Housing farm =1 if lives in a house on farm 0.078 249,273
Housing house =1 if lives in a house 0.771 249,273
Socap visit Spends time with friends/family, times/week 4.364 246,036
Socap phone Talks to someone on phone, times/week 6.608 246,036
Socap group Goes to meetings of social groups, times/week 1.403 246,036
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Variable name Description Mean Observations
Socap ppl Number of people nearby on which can depend on 7.128 239,924
B. Objective health measures from administrative data
Surg el 1yago =1 if had an elective surgery 1 year(s) ago 0.029 249,273
Surg el 2yago =1 if had an elective surgery 2 year(s) ago 0.027 249,273
Surg el 3yago =1 if had an elective surgery 3 year(s) ago 0.025 249,273
Surg el 4yago =1 if had an elective surgery 4 year(s) ago 0.022 249,273
Surg el 5yago =1 if had an elective surgery 5 year(s) ago 0.020 249,273
Surg nel 1yago =1 if had a non-elective surgery 1 year(s) ago 0.008 249,273
Surg nel 2yago =1 if had a non-elective surgery 2 year(s) ago 0.009 249,273
Surg nel 3yago =1 if had a non-elective surgery 3 year(s) ago 0.008 249,273
Surg nel 4yago =1 if had a non-elective surgery 4 year(s) ago 0.008 249,273
Surg nel 5yago =1 if had a non-elective surgery 5 year(s) ago 0.008 249,273
Hosp oth 1yago =1 if admitted for other reasons 1 year(s) ago 0.227 249,273
Hosp oth 2yago =1 if admitted for other reasons 2 year(s) ago 0.211 249,273
Hosp oth 3yago =1 if admitted for other reasons 3 year(s) ago 0.195 249,273
Hosp oth 4yago =1 if admitted for other reasons 4 year(s) ago 0.183 249,273
Hosp oth 5yago =1 if admitted for other reasons 5 year(s) ago 0.175 249,273
Hdiag infec 1c =1 if diagnosed with infectious and parasitic disease 1 year ago 0.014 249,273
Hdiag maneo 1c =1 if diagnosed with malignant neoplasm 1 year ago 0.016 249,273
Hdiag beneo 1c =1 if diagnosed with benign/in situ neoplasm 1 year ago 0.042 249,273
Hdiag diabet 1c =1 if diagnosed with diabetes 1 year ago 0.025 249,273
Hdiag metabol 1c =1 if diagnosed nutritional/metabolic disease 1 year ago 0.026 249,273
Hdiag hepabil 1c =1 if diagnosed with hepatobiliary disorder 1 year ago 0.006 249,273
Hdiag gastro 1c =1 if diagnosed with gastrointestinal disease 1 year ago 0.080 249,273
Hdiag musskel 1c =1 if diagnosed with musculoskeletal disease 1 year ago 0.046 249,273
Hdiag hematol 1c =1 if diagnosed with hematological disease 1 year ago 0.011 249,273
Hdiag psychi 1c =1 if diagnosed with psychiatric disease 1 year ago 0.005 249,273
Hdiag neuro 1c =1 if diagnosed with neurological disorder 1 year ago 0.013 249,273
Hdiag cardio 1c =1 if diagnosed with cardiovascular disease 1 year ago 0.055 249,273
Hdiag vascu 1c =1 if diagnosed with vascular disease 1 year ago 0.012 249,273
Hdiag pulmo 1c =1 if diagnosed with pulmonary disease 1 year ago 0.015 249,273
Hdiag ophthal 1c =1 if diagnosed with ophthalmic disease 1 year ago 0.027 249,273
Hdiag ENT 1c =1 if diagnosed with ears/nose/throat disease 1 year ago 0.010 249,273
Hdiag urinar 1c =1 if diagnosed with urinary disease 1 year ago 0.023 249,273
Hdiag genital 1c =1 if diagnosed with genital disease 1 year ago 0.018 249,273
Hdiag derma 1c =1 if diagnosed with dermatological disorder 1 year ago 0.013 249,273
Hdiag injury 1c =1 if admitted for injury, poisoning 1 year ago 0.010 249,273
Hdiag screen 1c =1 if admitted for screening/history 1 year ago 0.102 249,273
Hdiag compli 1c =1 if admitted for complications of care 1 year ago 0.014 249,273
Hdiag lcom 1c =1 if diagnosed with less-common conditions 1 year ago 0.014 249,273
Hdiag lwdef 1c =1 if diagnosed with less-well defined conditions 1 year ago 0.059 249,273
C. Objective health measures from survey data
Diag cancer =1 if diagnosed with cancer 0.360 249,273
Diag hrtdis =1 if diagnosed with heart disease 0.119 249,273
Diag highbp =1 if diagnosed with high blood pressure 0.357 249,273
Diag stroke =1 if diagnosed with stroke 0.031 249,273
Diag diabet =1 if diagnosed with diabet 0.089 249,273
Diag bldclot =1 if diagnosed with blood clot 0.046 249,273
Diag asthmhayf =1 if diagnosed with asthma/hay fever 0.215 249,273
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Diag Parkin =1 if diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease 0.006 249,273
Treat cancer =1 if treated for cancer in the last month 0.028 249,273
Treat hrtattack =1 if treated for heart attack in the last month 0.026 249,273
Treat othhrtdis =1 if treated for other heart disease in the last month 0.028 249,273
Treat highbp =1 if treated for high blood pressure in the last month 0.244 249,273
Treat cholest =1 if treated for high cholesterol in the last month 0.152 249,273
Treat bldclot =1 if treated for blood clotting problems in the last month 0.019 249,273
Treat asthma =1 if treated for asthma in the last month 0.047 249,273
Treat arthrit =1 if treated for osteoarthritis in the last month 0.080 249,273
Treat thyroid =1 if treated for thyroid problems in the last month 0.050 249,273
Treat osteop =1 if treated for osteoporosis in the last month 0.057 249,273
Treat depranx =1 if treated for depression/anxiety in the last month 0.082 249,273
Vitamins =1 if has taken vitamins in the past 4 weeks 0.247 249,273
Suppl omega3 =1 if took fish oil/Omega 3 in the past 4 weeks 0.327 249,273
Suppl glucosam =1 if took glucosamine in the past 4 weeks 0.222 249,273
Drugs hrtdis =1 if took drugs for heart disease in the past 4 weeks 0.028 249,273
Drugs highbp =1 if took drugs for hypertension in the past 4 weeks 0.218 249,273
Drugs cholest =1 if took drugs for cholesterol in the past 4 weeks 0.218 249,273
Drugs bldclot =1 if took drugs for blood clot in the past 4 weeks 0.198 249,273
Drugs diabet =1 if took drugs for diabetes in the past 4 weeks 0.049 249,273
Drugs asthma =1 if took drugs for asthma in the past 4 weeks 0.055 249,273
Drugs thyroid =1 if took drugs for thyroid in the past 4 weeks 0.048 249,273
Drugs osteop =1 if took drugs for osteoporosis in the past 4 weeks 0.108 249,273
Drugs hrtburn =1 if took drugs for heart burn in the past 4 weeks 0.137 249,273
Drugs kidney =1 if took drugs for kidney disease in the past 4 weeks 0.034 249,273
Surg knee =1 if had knee replacement operation 0.042 249,273
Surg hip =1 if had hip replacement operation 0.032 249,273
Surg gallbladder =1 if had gall bladder removal operation 0.102 249,273
Surg heart =1 if had heart or coronary bypass surgery 0.059 249,273
Surg reprodorg =1 if had reproductive organ operation 0.413 249,273
Surg skinca =1 if had skin cancer removal operation 0.267 249,273
FHH cancer =1 if family history of cancer 0.459 228,689
FHH hrtdis =1 if family history of heart disease 0.474 228,689
FHH highbp =1 if family history of high blood pressure 0.526 228,689
FHH stroke =1 if family history of stroke 0.270 228,689
FHH diabet =1 if family history of diabetes 0.239 228,689
FHH arthrit =1 if family history of arthritis 0.222 228,689
FHH osteop =1 if family history of osteoporosis 0.153 228,689
FHH hipfrac =1 if family history of hip fracture 0.100 228,689
FHH Parkin =1 if family history of Parkinson’s disease 0.048 228,689
FHH Alzh =1 if family history of Alzheimer’s disease 0.169 228,689
FHH depress =1 if family history of depression 0.129 228,689
Disability =1 if has a long-term illness/disability 0.056 237,987
Phys func Physical Functioning scale, 0(low)-100(high) 82.104 225,630
BMI Body mass index 27.085 232,135
Teethnum nob =1 if has no teeth left 0.092 242,383
Teethnum 1 9 =1 if has 1-9 teeth left 0.099 242,383
Teethnum 10 19 =1 if has 10-19 teeth left 0.201 242,383
Teethnum 20mo =1 if has >= 20 teeth left 0.609 242,383
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Broken bone =1 if had broken bone in the past 5 yrs 0.118 240,349
Urinel neverb =1 if never troubled by leaking urine 0.673 240,495
Urinel 1tl =1 if troubled by leaking urine <= 1 time/wk 0.162 240,495
Urinel 2 3t =1 if troubled by leaking urine 2-3 times/wk 0.074 240,495
Urinel 4 6t =1 if troubled by leaking 4-6 times/wk 0.033 240,495
Urinel eveday =1 if troubled by leaking urine everyday 0.057 240,495
Hear loss =1 if has hearing loss 0.421 242,015
Falls Number of falls in the past 5 years 0.507 237,049
K10 score Kessler psychological distress scale (K10) 13.814 214,685
D. Subjective health measures
SAH fpb =1 if self-rated health is fair/poor 0.139 241,080
SAH g =1 if self-rated health is good 0.337 241,080
SAH vg =1 if self-rated health is very good 0.372 241,080
SAH exc =1 if self-rated health is excellent 0.152 241,080
QoL fpb =1 if self-rated quality of life is fair/poor 0.104 236,953
QoL g =1 if self-rated quality is good 0.281 236,953
QoL vg =1 if self-rated quality is very good 0.376 236,953
QoL exc =1 if self-rated quality is excellent 0.239 236,953
Vision fpb =1 if self-rated vision is fair/poor 0.165 241,056
Vision g =1 if self-rated vision is good 0.406 241,056
Vision vg =1 if self-rated vision is very good 0.320 241,056
Vision exc =1 if self-rated vision is excellent 0.109 241,056
Teethh fpb =1 if self-rated teeth and gums are fair/poor 0.270 237,025
Teethh g =1 if self-rated teeth and gums are good 0.382 237,025
Teethh vg =1 if self-rated teeth and gums are very good 0.259 237,025
Teethh exc =1 if self-rated teeth and gums are excellent 0.089 237,025
Memory fpb =1 if self-rated memory is fair/poor 0.172 241,496
Memory g =1 if self-rated memory is good 0.381 241,496
Memory vg =1 if self-rated memory is very good 0.316 241,496
Memory exc =1 if self-rated memory is excellent 0.130 241,496
E. Proxies for preference heterogeneity
Drinks pwk Number of alcoholic drinks per week 6.995 244,618
Smoked never =1 if never smoked 0.574 249,273
Smoked before =1 if smoked before, not now 0.355 249,273
Smokes now = 1 if smokes now 0.071 249,273
Exer walk Walking at least 10min, times/week 5.392 244,733
Exer vigour Vigorous exercise, times/week 1.429 244,733
Exer mod Moderate exercise, times/week 4.194 244,733
Out hrswd Time spent outdoors on weekday, hrs/day 3.193 244,351
Out hrswe Time spent outdoors on weekend, hrs/day 4.492 244,351
Hrs sleep Time spent sleeping, hrs/day 7.612 245,716
Hrs sit Time spent sitting, hrs/day 5.223 245,716
Hrs screen Time spent watching TV/using computer, hrs/day 4.105 245,716
Hrs stand Time spent standing, hrs/day 4.228 245,716
Pro redmeat Red meat, times/week 3.386 244,885
Pro chicken Chicken, times/week 2.265 244,885
Pro sausages Sausages, times/week 1.345 244,885
Pro fish Fish, times/week 1.771 244,885
Pro cheese Cheese, times/week 3.286 244,885
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Carbs brbread Slices of brown/wholemeal bread per week 10.174 242,833
Carbs cereal Bowls of breakfast cerel per week 4.529 242,833
Veg cooked Serves of cooked vegetables per day 2.510 244,298
Veg raw Serves of raw vegetables per day 1.416 244,298
Fruit raw Serves of fruit per day 1.914 243,859
Fruit juice Glasses of fruit juice per day 0.616 243,859
Milk whole =1 if drinks whole milk 0.313 243,487
Milk lowfat =1 if drinks reduced fat milk 0.370 243,487
Milk skim =1 if drinks skim milk 0.219 243,487
Milk soy =1 if drinks soy milk 0.080 243,487
Milk other =1 if drinks other milk 0.024 243,487
Test psamam =1 if had PSA test/mammogram 0.818 243,996
Test bowelca =1 if had bowel cancer test 0.505 243,752
Notes:
Analysis sample size is 249,273 observations.
a Regressions control for age-in-years dummies.
b Omitted category in regressions.
c Conditions diagnosed 5, 4, 3 and 2 years ago are also included in regressions.
41
Table A.2: Effects of demographic and socio-economic variables on elective and non-
elective surgeries and PHI
Elective surgeries Non-elective surgeries PHI
APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E. APE, ppt. S.E.
Male 0.053 (0.097) 0.012 (0.045) −0.955∗∗∗ (0.232)
Married 0.046 (0.082) 0.015 (0.041) 6.989∗∗∗ (0.217)
Children −0.033 (0.022) 0.002 (0.011) −1.252∗∗∗ (0.057)
Loc remotreg 0.170∗ (0.087) 0.011 (0.040) −2.715∗∗∗ (0.210)
CoB Au 0.266 (0.165) −0.010 (0.079) 4.117∗∗∗ (0.406)
CoB ES 0.135 (0.194) 0.095 (0.095) −3.979∗∗∗ (0.452)
Ances Au −0.010 (0.091) 0.082 (0.044) −0.543∗ (0.223)
Ances En −0.029 (0.084) −0.005 (0.039) −1.045∗∗∗ (0.205)
Ances othEu −0.104 (0.122) 0.024 (0.058) 0.139 (0.287)
Ances oth −0.306∗ (0.120) 0.004 (0.059) −1.719∗∗∗ (0.301)
Oth lang −0.077 (0.163) 0.026 (0.077) −1.395∗∗∗ (0.385)
Educ hs −0.266∗ (0.119) −0.008 (0.058) 4.784∗∗∗ (0.280)
Educ trade 0.091 (0.115) 0.010 (0.054) 1.405∗∗∗ (0.275)
Educ cert −0.069 (0.097) −0.010 (0.046) 5.908∗∗∗ (0.225)
Educ univ 0.054 (0.109) −0.053 (0.049) 10.080∗∗∗ (0.251)
Inc 5 10k −0.224 (0.270) −0.007 (0.140) −7.212∗∗∗ (0.782)
Inc 10 20k −0.096 (0.254) −0.051 (0.122) −5.165∗∗∗ (0.693)
Inc 20 30k −0.089 (0.261) 0.092 (0.144) 3.261∗∗∗ (0.641)
Inc 30 40k −0.305 (0.257) 0.141 (0.156) 9.495∗∗∗ (0.605)
Inc 40 50k −0.379 (0.259) 0.039 (0.144) 11.652∗∗∗ (0.594)
Inc 50 70k −0.090 (0.274) −0.011 (0.134) 15.012∗∗∗ (0.566)
Inc mt70k −0.118 (0.269) 0.022 (0.136) 25.223∗∗∗ (0.560)
SEIFA 2dec 0.183 (0.263) 0.053 (0.128) 1.189∗ (0.567)
SEIFA 3dec 0.270 (0.271) 0.081 (0.134) 4.591∗∗∗ (0.553)
SEIFA 4dec 0.053 (0.247) 0.099 (0.129) 3.957∗∗∗ (0.530)
SEIFA 5dec 0.475 (0.272) 0.193 (0.143) 6.386∗∗∗ (0.522)
SEIFA 6dec 0.153 (0.245) 0.103 (0.125) 7.242∗∗∗ (0.501)
SEIFA 7dec 0.261 (0.256) 0.155 (0.134) 8.689∗∗∗ (0.502)
SEIFA 8dec 0.113 (0.258) 0.279 (0.156) 10.768∗∗∗ (0.499)
SEIFA 9dec 0.272 (0.272) 0.109 (0.138) 12.604∗∗∗ (0.501)
SEIFA 10dec 0.643∗ (0.272) 0.161 (0.135) 18.720∗∗∗ (0.477)
Employed −0.360∗∗∗ (0.101) −0.053 (0.046) 3.951∗∗∗ (0.241)
Housing flat 0.586∗∗ (0.182) 0.065 (0.092) −1.297∗∗ (0.458)
Housing farm 0.290 (0.212) −0.030 (0.096) 6.796∗∗∗ (0.456)
Housing house 0.440∗∗∗ (0.132) 0.064 (0.071) 4.220∗∗∗ (0.405)
Socap visit 0.006 (0.006) 0.002 (0.003) 0.058∗∗∗ (0.015)
Socap phone 0.000a (0.004) −0.001 (0.002) 0.079∗∗∗ (0.009)
Socap group 0.020 (0.014) −0.001 (0.007) 0.119∗∗ (0.038)
Socap ppl −0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001) 0.027∗∗∗ (0.008)
2007 0.110 (0.156) −0.056 (0.061) −0.088 (0.379)
2008 0.181 (0.098) −0.298∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.088 (0.240)
Wald test Chi2 stat 1663.050 99.670 27825.950
Wald test p-value 0.000 0.149 0.000
Mean of dep var, % 3.038 0.056 64.837
Notes: Sample size is 249,273. All regressions control for objective and subjective health measures and
risk behaviours. The bottom panel presents Chi-square statistics and p-values for Wald test of joint
significance of all demographic and socio-economic variables (including age). Symbols ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
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denote statistical significance at the 5%, 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. Symbol a indicates that the
absolute value of the coefficient is less than 0.0005.
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